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INTRODUCTION
In April, 1961, the Wall Street Journal took note of a phenomenon
on the litigation scene, the increase in stockholders' derivative suits.'
Approximately five years later, the Journal carried a second account
concerning this development.2 The more recent article observed
whimsically:
Those corporate executives who have seen angry stock-
holders only as hecklers at annual meetings ought to be
thankful. A growing number of company officers and
directors are having to argue with irate shareholders in
court-and if they lose the argument it can cost them not
merely their composure, but big money.3
The report went on to state that, while no count was available as to
the number of executive liability suits currently being litigated, lawyers
and corporate representatives agreed that the number is growing
rapidly.
Examination of West's Seventh Decennial Digest for the years
1956-66 suggests that the consensus referred to is founded in fact.4 A
casual count reveals that in excess of 470 derivative suits are reported in
those volumes. This represents an increase of approximately 160
cases over the number reported for the prior decade in the Sixth
t Professor of Law, University of California, Davis. B.S., Wisconsin State
University, 1938. LL.B. 1947, S.J.D. 1950, University of Wisconsin. Member, Wis-
consin and Utah Bars.
I Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1961, at 1, col. 6.
2 Id. June 29, 1966, at 1, col. 6.
3 The article also noted that most derivative actions are based on state laws
which, though they differ in specifics, as a "general rule . . .provide that an execu-
tive is liable for damage to his company only if he does not use 'ordinary or reasonable
care' in managing it." The article then observed:
The trouble for executives, lawyers say, is that courts are becoming more
strict in defining what is "ordinary and reasonable" care in running a business.
"What the courts accepted as ordinary or reasonable 10 years ago might be
negligence today," says Herbert Brook, a Chicago attorney and insurance law
specialist.
Mr. Brook and other lawyers who take this view concede they can't point
to specific cases to illustrate it because the precise acts or failures to act
alleged in executive-liability cases are hardly ever the same from one case
to another. But they, and some corporate executives, point to other evidence
of what they consider an increasingly solicitous attitude by courts towards
small stockholders bringing suits.
Id.
4 SEVENThi DE CENNIAL DIGEsT, 1956-66 (West).
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Decennial Digest.' When it is realized that the cases referred to in
the digests represent only a fraction of such litigation, it is apparent
that derivative actions by stockholders are indeed big business.
It may, of course, be argued that the increase in derivative suits
simply reflects the increase in the number of corporations currently
being formed." This, however, is only part of the story. It is the
contention of this article that such actions have flourished because they
serve a basic and increasing need in the contemporary economy. It is
further contended that this basic need has recently received tacit, if
not overt recognition from the judiciary and, to a lesser extent, from
various legislatures. Because of this recognition, litigants currently
walking the derivative road will occasionally find that they can plow
through or avoid hurdles which were previously insurmountable.
The hurdles referred to are neither simple nor insignificant. They
carry such names as "security for expenses," "contemporaneous owner-
ship" and "demands on directors and shareholders." They are, for
the most part, the by-products of the "strike suit" and represent re-
actions to abuse of the judicial process by stockholders whose motive
in bringing suit is personal gain rather than corporate benefit.
Because this abuse has been very real, it would be unfair to
conclude that such reactions are unjustified. Unfortunately, how-
ever, they too often have taken the form of general and indiscriminate
hostility to the derivative suit-a hostility shared, and sometimes
promoted, by the organized bar. Dean Rostow sensed this fact when
he wrote:
[O]ne would expect those concerned for the integrity and
future of private business institutions to applaud the intrepid
souls who ferret out corporate wrongdoing, and risk their
own time and money against a contingency of being re-
warded, if in the end sin is found to have flourished. Not
at all. Such men are not treated as honored members of
the system of private enterprise, but as its scavengers and
pariahs. Their lawyers rarely become presidents of bar asso-
ciations, or trustees of charitable bodies. They receive no
honorary degrees. At best they are viewed as necessary
evils, the Robin Hoods of the business world, for whom a
patronizing word may sometimes be said, when they succeed
in revealing some particularly horrendous act.
G SIXTH DEca rIiAL DiGmST, 1946-56 (West). The number of suits is based
upon the derivative actions cited under Corporations, key numbers 202-14, 307-23.
6 During 1965, 203,897 new corporations (statistics courtesy of Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc.) were incorporated in the 50 states, an all-time high for a single year. Nineteen
sLxty-six promises to be another record-breaker. More than 20,000 new corporations
were incorporated during March, establishing a new high for a single month. The
total for the first quarter of 1966 (56,472 companies incorporated), is 2,536 higher
than the total for the first quarter of 1965. 24 CoRp. J. 366 (1966).
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The Dean went on to note that courts and legislatures share this
unfriendly attitude towards stockholder suits.
Many judges dismiss them on any plausible technical ground.
Procedural obstacles bristle, and are relentlessly enforced.
The substantive doctrines of law, and especially the wide
scope given to the directors' "business judgment," make
liability infrequent. Both statutes and judge-made law treat
as dubious, or worse, the professional stockholders' suit
against those who misuse other peoples' money.
7
These attitudes reached their peak in 1944 when a Special Com-
mittee on Corporate Litigation for the Chamber of Commerce of the
State of New York' issued a study, directed by Franklin S. Wood,
entitled Survey and Report Regarding Stockholder's Derivative Suits.'
The study surveyed 1,266 suits filed by shareholders in New York
County, Kings County and the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York during the years 1932-42. While the report
unquestionably highlighted costs, problems and abuses related to
derivative suits, its effectiveness was diminished by its lack of candor
and objectivity. Its purported objective was "to determine the ad-
visability of possible changes in law or procedure which would
facilitate the correction of wrong-doing in corporate affairs but reduce
groundless and costly litigation of this type." 'o In reality, it ignored
"the correction of wrong-doing in corporate affairs" and became, in
fact, a brief on "the alleged need for reducing litigation by
stockholders." "
Despite its obvious bias the study had some immediate impact,
for it induced the New York legislature to enact the first "security
for expenses" statute.' Although discussion of this measure and
7 Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible.,
in THE CoRoRTIoN IN MODERN SocIETY 49 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
S Professor Hornstein has noted a communication sent by the Springfield (Ill)
Chamber of Commerce to the Editor of Forbes Magazine, published in that magazine,
May 15, 1944, at 10, which states:
The N.Y. State Chamber of Commerce, to which you credit this action,
is not in fact a state chamber at all and is indeed entirely different from most
chambers of commerce. It is a strictly New York organization composed
largely of the extremely conservative corporation and financial interests of
that city.
Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 2
n.8 (1947).
9 For a highly critical comment on the report, see Hornstein, The Death Knell
of Stockholders' Derivative Sits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944).
10 SPECIAL CoMlIT ON CORPORATE LITIGATION OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRx, SURVE Y AND REPORT REGARDING STOcKHoLDERs' DERIVA-
TIvE SuITs 1 (1944).
11 Hornstein, supra note 9, at 127.
12 N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 627. Also see N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 61-b.
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others which copied it is reserved until later,13 it is appropriate to ob-
serve at this juncture that such enactments are the most oppressive of
the various obstacles which confront shareholder plaintiffs.
THECURRENT ROLE OF THE DERIVATIVE SUIT
In view of these obstacles, it is surprising that the number of
derivative suits is increasing. The explanation, as indicated, is two-
fold: first, such suits are being called upon to play an increasingly
essential role in our economy; second, there is a growing judicial and
legislative awareness of this role, an awareness which has permitted
increased flexibility in the technical structure of the derivative suit.
One critic, commenting on the importance of shareholder actions, has
observed that they are "the most important procedure the law has yet
developed to police the internal affairs of corporations." :4 On the
same subject, Judge Rifkind, although noting that such suits are gen-
erally "slow, cumbersome and expensive to all concerned," '" expressed
the following opinion:
Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connec-
tion with suits they have accomplished much in policing the
corporate system especially in protecting corporate ownership
as against corporate management. They have educated corpo-
rate directors in the principles of fiduciary responsibility and
undivided loyalty. They have encouraged faith in the wisdom
of full disclosure to stockholders. They have discouraged
membership on boards by persons not truly interested in the
corporation. . . . The measure of effectiveness of the stock-
holder's derivative suit cannot be taken by a computation of
the money recovery in the litigated cases. The minatory
effect of such actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of
large amounts from stockholders to managements and out-
siders. Corporate attorneys now have an arsenal of authori-
ties to support their cautioning advice to clients who may be
disposed to risk evasion of the high standard the courts have
imposed upon directors.'
6
A random sampling of approximately 325 derivative actions con-
firms the validity of Judge Rifkind's observations. It portrays many
instances in which shareholders successfully challenged or stated
good causes of action for excessive salaries,"T the issuance of stock
13 See text accompanying notes 91-125 infra.
14 Rostow, supra note 7, at 48.
15 Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
16Id. at 525-26.
17 Smith v. Dunlap, 269 Ala. 97, 111 So. 2d 1 (1959) ; Bachelder v. Brentwood
Lanes, Inc., 369 Mich. 155, 119 N.W.2d 630 (1963).
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for no or insufficient consideration,' diversion of corporate busi-
ness opportunity, 19 misapplication of funds, 20 secret profits,21 exces-
sive stock options,22 violations of contractual arrangements,2 3 im-
proper individual claims as opposed to corporate claims for surrender
shares,2 4 the unlawful purchase by a corporation of its own securities, 5
illegal payment for shares in another corporation,2 6 sale of control,
improvident loans 28 and the abuse of a subsidiary by the parent.
2 9
While this catalogue of misbehavior is "old hat" to lawyers familiar
with corporate activities, it, nonetheless, serves as a sharp reminder
that, day in and day out, the derivative action plays the role of
"corporate policeman." There may be substitutes for the derivative
suit, but so far none has been introduced that could be effectively
implemented.
It is because the derivative suit is a needed policeman that it has
refused to die. Developments over the past few decades have accen-
tuated that need. These developments are perhaps best summarized
in Professor Berle's observation that since 1932 "the trend toward
dominance of that collective capitalism we call the 'corporate system'
has continued unabated." " As evidence of this conclusion, Berle
notes the significant increase in the amount of productive property
under corporate control,' the growth in the number of shareholders,82
18 Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); McDonnell
v. Birrell, 196 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub norn. McDonnell v. Tabah, 297
F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1961).
19 Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 279 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1960); Guth v. Loft,
Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Zampetti v. Cavanaugh, 406 Pa.
259, 176 A.2d 906 (1962).
2 0 Winter v. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union of America, 259 Minn. 257, 107
N.W.2d 226 (1961).
21 Albert v. Black Motor Co., 357 S.W.2d 714 (Ky. 1962). For further develop-
ments in this case, see Black Motor Co. v. Hill, 372 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1963); Black
Motor Co. v. Greene, 385 S.W.2d 954 (Ky. 1964).
22 Teren v. Howard, 322 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1963) ; Kerbs v. California E. Air-
ways, 33 Del. Ch. 69, 90 A.2d 652 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
2 3 Lait v. Leon, 40 Misc. 2d 60, 242 N.Y.S.2d 776 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
24 Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 35 Misc. 2d 570, 231 N.Y.S.2d 541 (Sup.
Ct. 1962).
25 Propp v. Sadacca, 40 Del. Ch. 113, 175 A.2d 33 (Ch. 1961).
28 Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
27 Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955).
28 Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1964).
29 Ripley v. International Rys. of Cent. America, 8 N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443,
209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960). For further developments, see 12 N.Y.2d 814, 187 N.E.2d
131, 236 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1962).
30 Berle, Property, Production and Revolution, 65 COLum. L. REv. 1, 2 (1965).
31 "Outside of agriculture, well over ninety percent of all the production in the
country is carried on by more than a million corporations." Id. at 2.
82A New York Stock Exchange publication entitled SHAREOWNxaSHn U.S.A.
(1966) estimates on the basis of a 1965 census that there are approximately 20,120,000
shareowners in the United States. Id. at 11.
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and the expanding role played by corporate securities as a component
of individual wealth. 3 His analysis of these facts strengthens the
thesis he first espoused in 1932, that the corporate economy has, in
large part, separated ownership from control.
3 4
Berle recently phrased this conclusion in the following terms:
[M]ost "owners" own stock, insurance savings and pension
claims and the like, and do not manage; most managers
(corporate administrators) do not own. The corporate col-
lective holds legal title to the tangible productive wealth of the
country-for the benefit of others. 5
Although Professor Berle's views have been subjected to fre-
quent attack, few writers have challenged his thesis of the separation
of ownership from control.36 He seems to be on solid ground when
he observes that the chasm between the two is widening. Each year
financial institutions, such as savings and loan associations, mutual
funds, trust departments, insurance companies and banks, are acquir-
ring an increasing number of shares in our largest corporations.37
Of necessity, such acquisitions serve to remove productive property and
its control one step further from those whose wealth is invested in
these institutions.
Coupled with this development is the fact that subsidiary corpo-
rations have become an increasingly popular means of doing business.38
33 The property system as applied to productive assets breaks down (as of
the end of 1963) as follows: 525 billion dollars of shares of corporate stock;
210 billion dollars in fixed income financial assets (federal, state and local
government securities, corporate and foreign bonds, life insurance values,
etc.) ; and 360 billion dollars in liquid assets, chiefly cash in banks. These
figures mean that, far and away, the largest item of personally owned
"property" representing productive assets and enterprise is in the form of
stock of corporations. In addition, a substantial amount of other assets held
by individuals consists of claims against intermediate financial institutions-
banks, insurance companies and the like, whose holdings include large amounts
of corporation stocks, bonds and securities. "Individually-owned" enterprise
is thus steadily disappearing.
Berle, supra note 30, at 3.
34 See A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY (1932).
35 Berle, supra note 30, at 4.
36 See Harbrecht, The Modern Corporation Revisited, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1410
(1964).
37 Berle notes:
No one really knows the exact percentage of institutional holdings of
stocks. Mutual investment funds are wholly invested in stock: They are
reported to aggregate about $29 billion. No figures are available on pension
trust holdings and insurance company holdings (such holdings are small due
to statutory limitation on this kind of investment). A sophisticated guess
on the generous side would be total holdings of around $50 billion or less than
10% of the value of outstanding stocks-hence the rough estimate. The
percentage is probably slowly rising.
Berle, spra note 30, at 14 n.39.
38 See Painter, Double Derivative Suits and Other Remedies with Regard to
Damaged Subsidiaries, 36 IND. L.J. 143 (1961).
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While this phenomenon has many ramifications, it is sufficient to
observe that it too serves to centralize control and to separate it from
the ultimate investor.
Because of these developments, it might be assumed that legisla-
tures would have acted to increase the safeguards surrounding man-
agerial discretion. With the exception of the various measures enacted
to regulate securities, 9 such an assumption would be erroneous. In
fact, recently adopted corporate codes have had the opposite impact
for they have characteristically enhanced the authority of officers and
directors 4 without the inclusion of counter-balancing provisions de-
signed to assure the proper discharge of increased power. Typically,
they provide that "the business and affairs of a corporation shall
be managed by a board of directors." 41 This provision has been
buttressed by statutes or by authorized articles of incorporation which
specifically provide for broad managerial discretion in respect to prop-
erty,42 dividends," capital," compensation,48 indemnification, 4 preemp-
tive rights,47 by-laws 4 and delegation of authority.
49
Although the primary concern of this article is with the share-
holder-management relationship, it is appropriate to observe that the
power structure referred to has implications which extend far beyond
the immediate concerns of these two groups. Policy decisions which
determine plant location, production level, diversification, investments,
prices, wages, union relationships and dividends have an obvious im-
pact on employees, consumers and communities, and on the economic
and social well-being of the society at large. It is recognized, of
course, that management's freedom of choice as to these matters is not
39 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964); Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964); Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a-z (1964); Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-
bbbb (1964) ; Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1964) ; Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b (1964); Chap. X of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 882, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1964).
40 For critical comment, see Harris, The Model Business Incorporation Act-
lnzitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1955); Note, Economic Insti-
tutions and Values: Fiduciary Responsibility of Corporate Officers and Directors,
36 NoTRE DAME LAW. 343 (1961).
41 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. Copp. ACT § 33 (1966). In Ecoiwimic Institutiols
and Values, supra note 40, at 357, it is stated that "thirty-one states have statutes
providing for the creation of a board of directors in which corporate management
powers are to reside."4 2 See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 4(d)-(e) (1966).
4 3 See id. § 40.
44 See id. §§ 14-15, 17-19, 41.
45 See id. § 33. The final sentence in this section provides, "The board of directors
shall have authority to fix the compensation of directors unless otherwise provided
in the articles of incorporation."46 See id. § 4(o).
4" See id. § 24.
4 8 See id. §25.49 See id. §§ 38, 44.
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completely unrestricted, but neither is it as limited as some would sug-
gest. As Carl Kaysen has observed in respect to competition, which
is often considered the prime regulator of choice:
[N]o real firm functions in markets operating with the sure-
ness, swiftness, and freedom from frictions that would
eliminate the discretion of management entirely and make the
firm merely an instrument which registered the forces of the
market.5O
Given the complex and sophisticated world in which corporations
must operate, centralization of decision-making is understandable and
necessary. Merely because centralization is understandable and neces-
sary, however, does not mean that it can, or should, be ignored. How
the decision-making power is used is important to each of us, and
may well turn on the extent to which those who wield the power must
account for its use.
It is in the context of such accountability that we must view the
derivative suit. That management has largely escaped ownership
control should not lessen its responsibility to shareholders, nor should
it obviate the need to explain and justify its conduct. Rather, the con-
trary is true, for as ownership's voice recedes, the need for vigilance
increases, and accompanying that vigilance must be the means to bring
"to book" those who misuse their power.
This, in essence, is the case for the derivative suit. Though it
is an awkward, costly, and intricate mechanism, it continues to be "the
chief regulator of corporate management." " The developments re-
50 Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Powerf What Scope?, in THE CoR-
PoRAT oN iN MODERN SocsrY (E. Mason ed. 1966).
51 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). Mr.
Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, also observed:
As business enterprise increasingly sought the advantages of incorporation,
management became vested with almost uncontrolled discretion in handling
other people's money. The vast aggregate of funds committed to corporate
control came to be drawn to a considerable extent from numerous and scattered
holders of small interests. The director was not subject to an effective
accountability. That created strong temptation for managers to profit person-
ally at expense of their trust. The business code became all too tolerant of
such practices. Corporate laws were lax and were not self-enforcing, and
stockholders, in face of gravest abuses, were singularly impotent in obtaining
redress of abuses of trust.
Equity came to the relief of the stockholder, who had no standing to bring
civil action at law against faithless directors and managers. Equity, however,
allowed him to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its right the
restitution he could not demand in his own . . . . This remedy, born of
stockholders helplessness, was long the chief regulator of corporate manage-
ment and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least grosser forms of
betrayal of stockholders' interests . . ..
Unfortunately, the remedy itself provided opportunity for abuse, which
was not neglected. Suits sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs,
but to realize upon their nuisance value.
Id. at 547-48.
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ferred to, such as the separation between ownership and coiitrol and
the increased concentration of power in management, make the deriva-
tive action increasingly necessary. They further dictate that legisla-
tors and courts weigh with care impediments to the effective employ-
ment of shareholder actions. As Judge Frank has observed:
An economy like ours, which thrives on the fact that
thousands of persons of modest means invest in corporate
shares, will be poorly served if our courts regard with suspi-
cion all minority stockholders' suits, and, therefore, out of a
desire to discourage such suits, apply to them unusually strict
pleading rules, thus tending to thwart judicial inquiries into
the conduct of wrongdoing, controlling stockholders. The
unfortunate consequence will be that those in control may be
immunized from effective attacks on their misdeeds, and as a
result, the small investors will lose confidence in all corporate
managements, the honest as well as the dishonest.52
Some Illustrative Cases in the Federal Courts
An increasing number of courts appear to be heeding Judge
Frank's admonition. While the course of litigation is uneven, nu-
merous opinions reflect a conscious desire not to burden unduly those
who attempt to negotiate the shoals of a derivative suit, and the impact
of these opinions has been to relieve the burden of procedural rules
and statutory demands.'
A recent Supreme Court decision, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels
Corp.,4 illustrates this trend. In this derivative action the plaintiff
charged that the defendant officers and directors had defrauded the
corporation of several million dollars by engaging in stock manipula-
tion in violation of the Securities Act of 1933," 5 the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 56 and the Delaware General Corporation Law." The
complaint was signed by counsel in compliance with Rule 11 of the
52 Subin v. Goldsmith, 224 F.2d 753, 767 (2d Cir. 1955) (dissenting in part).
53 Dean De Capriles has noted, in reference to recent derivative suit statutes
(especially "security for expenses" statutes) that, "There have been . . . some
judicial decisions tending to soften the burden of the new legislation; other decisions
tend to aggravate it. It is fair to say, however, that the past fifteen years have seen
a significant change in this aspect of shareholders' control of management." De
Capriles, Fifteen-Year Survey of Corporate Developments, 1944-59, 13 VAND. L. REV.
1, 15 (1959).
54 383 U.S. 363 (1966).
55 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1964).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964).
57DE. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-368 (1953).
58 Rule 11 provides in part that:
The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there
is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. ...
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 and, as required by Rule 23(b),"
plaintiff Mrs. Surowitz verified the complaint, stating "that some of
the allegations were true and that she on 'information and belief,'
thought that all the allegations were true." 60 Pursuant to defendant's
motion, the trial judge required Mrs. Surowitz to submit to an oral
examination by defense counsel, in the course of which it became
evident that the petitioner did not understand the complaint and had
little knowledge concerning the facts alleged. Upon motion, the dis-
trict court dismissed the case, holding that Mrs. Surowitz's affidavit
was false and that thus there had been no real compliance with Rule
23(b). This determination was sustained by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.0 '
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the dismissal was reversed and
remanded for trial on the merits. Note was taken of the fact that,
while Mrs. Surowitz had little formal education and was handicapped
in her use of the English language, she did know that her son-in-law,
a Harvard Law School graduate, thought something was wrong, and
that these suspicions were shared by another attorney with whom he
consulted. It was further observed that these suspicions were not
allayed by investigation or by consultation with defendant's lawyers.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, stated:
It is difficult to believe that anyone could be shocked or
harmed in any way when, in the light of all these circum-
stances, Mrs. Surowitz verified the complaint, not on the
basis of her own knowledge and understanding, but in the
faith that her son-in-law had correctly advised her either that
the statements in the complaint were true or to the best of his
knowledge he believed them to be true."2
He further observed that Rule 23(b) was not designed to bar
derivative suits but only to discourage "strike suits," and realistically
noted that the record in the case reveals "the inescapable fact this
is not a strike suit or anything akin to it." 63 Mr. Justice Black then ex-
pressed concern that the opinion of the Court of Appeals would mean
that a shareholder such as "Mrs. Surowitz, who is uneducated gen-
erally and illiterate in economic matters, could never under any circum-
59 Pursuant to the changes in the Rules of Civil Procedure which became effective
July 1, 1966, Rule 23(b), as amended, is now numbered Rule 23.1. It provides in
part that
the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains
.... ,and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction
on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have ..
60 383 U.S. at 365.
61342 F.Zd 596 (7th Cir. 1965).
62 383 U.S. at 370-71.
63 Id. at 371.
3967l
84 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
stances be a plaintiff in a derivative suit brought in the federal courts
to protect her stock interests." 6
"We cannot," Justice Black wrote,
construe Rule 23 or any other one of the Federal Rules as
compelling courts to summarily dismiss . . . cases like this
where grave charges of fraud are shown by the record to be
based on reasonable beliefs growing out of careful investiga-
tion. The basic purpose of the Federal Rule is to administer
justice through fair trials, not through summary dismissals
as necessary as they may be on occasion. These rules were
designed in large part to get away from some of the old
procedural booby traps which common-law pleaders could set
to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day
in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in an
honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but
should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide com-
plaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits. Rule
23(b), like other civil rules, was written to further, not
defeat the ends of justice.'
The liberal, non-technical approach to derivative pleading reflected
in the above opinion is consistent with the attitude the judiciary has
taken generally in respect to shareholders' suits filed pursuant to acts
administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission.6" It is
accurate to observe that, because of judicial receptivity to such actions,
the securities acts are having an enormous impact on management
fiduciary responsibility, particularly in relation to matters concerning
issuance and reacquisition of corporate stock.
A case which further illustrates the pattern of derivative actions
under the federal security acts is McClure v. Borne Chemical Co.
67
Suit was filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania, on behalf of a
New Jersey corporation. Since both Pennsylvania and New Jersey
had "security for expenses" statutes,"8 the defendants moved to have
plaintiffs post a bond for expenses, including attorney's fees. The trial
judge denied the motion and his denial was sustained by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
64 Id. at 372.
65 Id. at 373.
6 6 See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Ruclde v. Roto Am.
Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d
Cir. 1961); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960);
Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1966); Simon v. New Haven Board &
Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D. Conn. 1966).
67292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939 (1961) (applying
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b) as implemented by SEC Rule 10b-5).
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp. 1966); Pa. P.L. 364, art V, § 516 (1933).
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Note was taken of the Supreme Court decision in Cohen v. Bene-
ficial Industrial Loan Corp.,9 which had held that "security for ex-
penses" statutes are substantive law, and, under the Erie doctrine, ap-
plicable in diversity actions. However, since jurisdiction in the action
before the court was predicated on a federal statute, and not on diversity
of citizenship, Erie was held not to be controlling. The court, therefore,
concluded that it could ignore the demands of Pennsylvania's "security
for expenses" statute. It had greater difficulty in reaching this con-
clusion in reference to the New Jersey statute. Since New Jersey was
the state of incorporation and the site of the company's principal office,
that state had a "clear interest in the relationship between the share-
holders and management of the corporation." 70 The court also was
aware that in the Cohen case the Supreme Court had observed:
The very nature of the stockholder's derivative action
makes it one in the regulation of which the legislature of a
state has wide powers. Whatever theory one may hold as
to the nature of the corporate entity, it remains a wholly
artificial creation whose internal relations between manage-
ment and stockholders are dependent upon state law and may
be subject to most complete and penetrating regulation, either
by public authority or by some form of stockholder action.
. . . We conclude that the state has plenary power over this
type of litigation."
Although these factors gave the court pause, it finally concluded
that the limitation should not apply "when the corporate right that
the plaintiff seeks to enforce derivatively arises under federal law." 72
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Biggs drew heavily upon the reason-
ing of the Second Circuit in Fielding v. Allen 7 and concluded that
the "policy of uniformity within the federal system is stronger than
any policy of conformity with local rules." "4 Judge Biggs then noted
that this rationale was particularly appropriate in the instant case, in
view of the fact that only a few states have adopted security statutes.
These statutes differ from one another, further detracting from the
uniformity essential to the federal statutory scheme. He observed:
[W]e do not believe that Sections 10(b) and 29(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act should be construed as being super-
imposed upon the stockholder-management relationship de-
69 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
70 292 F.2d at 831.
71337 U.S. at 459-50.
72292 F.2d at 831.
73 181 F2d 163 (2d Cir. 1950) (New York "security for expenses" statute
should not apply to a derivative action brought under the Interstate Commerce Act).
74 292 F.2d at 833.
86 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
fined by state security for expenses statutes, since the federal
provisions are a part of a statutory scheme which had as its
purpose the creation of a new federal law of management-
stockholder relations and which, therefore, may not be sub-
ordinated to limitations such as security for expenses statutes,
reflecting state policy in the same area.
Pressing the theme of a "new federal" corporation law, the
opinion noted:
That Act deals with the protection of investors, primarily
stockholders. It creates many managerial duties and liabilities
unknown to the common law. It expresses federal interest
in management-stockholder relationships which theretofore
had been almost exclusively the concern of the states ...
It can be said fairly that the Exchange Act . . . constitutes
far reaching federal substantive corporation law.7"
No doubt, many congressmen who served in 1934 would be sur-
prised to hear that the Securities Exchange Act, particularly section
10(b), had the broad sweep ascribed to it in the McClure opinion.
In fact, it is difficult to find many contemporary writers willing to
accept the full impact of this decision. 77  The court's emphasis on the
need for uniformity within the federal system, however, did find ready
acceptance, and for this reason, federal courts have not hesitated to
hold inapplicable state laws which they feel unduly hamper the prosecu-
tion of derivative suits under the securities acts.
This approach was recognized by the Supreme Court, in dictum,
in I. I. Case Co. v. Borak .7s The complaint of the plaintiff stockholder
alleged that a merger was effected through the use of misleading proxy
statements, a violation of section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act.79 Although the precise issue before the Court was limited to the
permissible remedy under section 27 of the act,"0 the Court, after
75 1d. at 834.
76 Id.
77 For criticisms of judicial expansion of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, see Ruder,
Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw.
U.L. Rzv. 627 (1963) ; Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Cor-
porations by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 185 (1964). For
attitudes sympathetic to such expansion, see Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law":
An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. Rxv. 1146 (1965); Joseph, Civil Liability Under Rule
lOb-5-A Reply, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 171 (1964).
78377 U.S. 426 (1964). This case has been extensively noted. See 50 A.B.A.J.
1170 (1964) ; Note, 52 CAIrF. L. Rxv. 185 (1964) ; 64 COLUM. L. REv. 1336 (1964) ;
50 CORNELL L.Q. 370 (1965); Note, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 809 (1965) ; Note, 42 TExAs
L. REV. 908 (1964) ; 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 160 (1964); Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv.
456 (1964) ; 18 VAND. L. REV. 275 (1964) ; 9 VIL. L. REv. 330 (1964).
79 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1964).
80 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964).
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recognizing that the denial of derivative rights under section 14 would
"be tantamount to a denial of private relief," S1 observed:
[I]f federal jurisdiction were limited to the granting of
declaratory relief, victims of deceptive proxy statements would
be obliged to go into state courts for remedial relief. And
if the law of the State happened to attach no responsibility
to the use of misleading proxy statements, the whole purpose
of the section might be frustrated. Furthermore, the hurdles
the victim might face (such as separate suits, . . . security
for expenses statutes, bringing in all parties necessary for
complete relief, etc.) might well prove insuperable to effective
relief 82
The impact of this dictum is apparent in the First Circuit's deci-
sion in Levitt v. Johnson.' The complaint alleged violations of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 " by various directors of Fidelity
Fund, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation. The trial court dismissed
the suit solely because plaintiff failed to allege a prior demand upon
stockholders.85 In dismissing, Judge Wyzanski held that even though
the claim was based on a federal statute, state law controlled stock-
holders' suits, and that law did not excuse plaintiff's failure to contact
other owners. 86
Judge Aldridge, speaking for the First Circuit, concluded that
Massachusetts law did not apply. The policy of the federal Investment
Company Act, concerned as it was with the public interest and the
interest of investors, prohibited any "substantial stiffening of the
conditions precedent to the bringing of stockholders' suits above normal
requirements." 87 The opinion, drawing support from J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak,"8 observed:
The district court's reasoning that since the stockholder's
right is a derivative one his right to bring suit must be con-
trolled by the local law of the state of incorporation in the
absence of an explicit congressional direction to the contrary
negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role
to be played by the federal courts in the implementation of
national regulatory legislation.89
81377 U.S. at 432 (1964).
821d. at 434-35. (Emphasis added.)
83334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), reversing 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass. 1963),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
8415 U.S.C. § 80a (1964).
85 222 F. Supp. at 812.
861d. at 808-12, citing S. Solamont & Son Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres
Operating Corp., 326 Mass. 99, 111, 93 N.E.2d 241, 247 (1950).
87334 F.2d at 819.
88 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
89 334 F.2d at 819.
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These cases, among others,90 show that actions arising under the
federal securities acts have become increasingly available to share-
holders' actions under appropriate circumstances. They also rather
clearly reflect the feeling that the policies articulated by these acts
should not be unduly obstructed by state-imposed procedural re-
quirements.
Security for Expenses
Apart from actions predicated upon federal statutes, judicial
attitudes towards the derivative suit reflect a more irregular pattern.
Nonetheless, it is accurate to conclude that even here recent court deci-
sions have generally refrained from extending legislative barriers to
their utmost limits.
Cases dealing with state statutes requiring security for expenses
illustrate the validity of this observation. Many decisions have eased
the cost burdens which otherwise would have been imposed on share-
holder plaintiffs. To appreciate the import of this fact, we must look
briefly at the "security for expenses" statutes.
The first such statute was enacted in New York in 1944, in
reaction to the Wood report."' It provided that a foreign or domestic
corporation on whose behalf an action is brought could, at any stage in
the proceedings before final judgment, require plaintiffs to give
"security for the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees" which
might be incurred in connection with the action, provided that those
bringing suit held "less than five per centum of the outstanding shares
of any class of such corporation's stock" or unless the securities so
held had "a market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars."
The act also stipulated that the "amount of such security may .
from time to time be increased or decreased in the discretion of the
court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive." 9 2
Once the New York legislature spoke, other states followed.
New Jersey, Maryland, Wisconsin and Pennsylvania enacted secu-
rity for expenses statutes the next year.93  California, the fifth state
90 See Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Hooper v. Mountain
States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Pappas v. Moss, 257 F. Supp. 344
(D.NJ. 1966); Simon v. New Haven Board & Carton Co., 250 F. Supp. 297 (D.
Conn. 1966).
9 1 
See SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE LITIGATION OF THE CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK, SURVEY AND REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDER'S
DERIVATIVE SurIs (1944), and text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
92 Ch. 668, § 61-b, [1944] N.Y. Laws 1455 (amended by N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw
§627 (Supp. 1966)).
9 3 See ch. 989, [19451 Md. Laws 1727 (now MD. R. Crv. P. 238(b)); ch. 131,
[1945] N.J. Laws 487 (now N.J. STAT. ANN. fit. 15, §14:3-15 (Supp. 1966));
no. 114, [1945] Pa. Laws 253 (now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2852-516 (Supp.
1966)) ; ch. 462, [1945] Wis. Laws (now Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1966)).
[Vol.116 :74
REVIVAL OF THE DERIVATIVE SUIT
to follow, waited until 1949.94 The measure then adopted was in
certain respects less burdensome than those already in effect. 5
Following this spate of activity, relative quiet prevailed for a
time on the legislative front. Recently, however, the lawmakers in
several additional states have promulgated security for expenses provi-
sions." These statutes were inspired by the amendment of the Model
Business Corporation Act a few years ago to include such a measure
as an optional section."
Considering the hostility to the derivative suit that prevails in
certain quarters, it is surprising that more states have not followed.
Perhaps second thoughts have been promoted by the trends to which
reference already has been made, and by the prompt and powerful
criticisms which were directed towards earlier enactments."' Whether
94 See ch. 499, [1949] Cal. Stat. 857 (now CAL. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 834 (1955)).
9 ; Under CAL. GEN. CoRP. LAw § 834, security for expenses is not granted auto-
matically upon motion by the defendants. The act requires that defendant's motion
be predicated on
one or more of the following grounds:
(1) That there is not reasonable probability that the prosecution of the cause
of action alleged in the complaint against the moving party will benefit
the corporation or its security holders;
(2) That the moving party, if other than the corporation, did not participate
in the transaction complained of in any capacity.
A hearing must be held on defendant's motion and, if the court determines after
presentation of the evidence "that the moving party has established a probability in
support of any of the grounds upon which the motion is based," it "shall fix the nature
and amount of security to be furnished by the plaintiff for reasonable expenses, in-
cluding attorney's fees ... ."
96 See ARK. STAT. ANN. 64-223 (Supp. 1966); COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. 31-4-21
(1963) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.131 (Supp. 1966) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2047 (Supp.
1963); N.D. REv. CoDE, 10-19-48 (1960); TEXAS Bus. CoRP. Act art. 5.14 (Supp.
1966); WASH. REv. CoDE § 23A.08.460 (Supp. 1966) (effective July 1, 1967).
97See ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. AcT ANN. § 43A, 1 (1960). The security
for expense portion of this optional section provides as follows:
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in the
right of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of less
than five per cent of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation
or of voting trust certificates therefor, unless the shares or voting trust cer-
tificates so held have a market value in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars,
the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled at any
time before final judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security
for the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, that may be incurred
by it in connection with such action or may be incurred by other parties
named as defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market value
shall be determined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the action or, in
the case of an intervener, as of the date that he becomes a party to the action.
The amount of such security may from time to time be increased or decreased,
in the discretion of the court, upon showing that the security provided has or
may become inadequate or is excessive. The corporation shall haie recourse
to such security in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall deter-
mine upon the termination of such action, whether or not the court finds the
action was brought without reasonable cause.
98 See, e.g., Hornstein, The Death Knell of Shareholders' Derivative Suits in
New York, 32 CALIF. L. REV. 123 (1944) ; Zlinkoff, The American Investor and the
Constitutionality of Section 61-B of the New York General Corporation Law, 54
YALE L.J. 352 (1945); Hornstein, New Aspects of Stockholders' Derivative Suits,
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or not these factors explain why more such statutes have not been
passed, they do explain why recent enactments and amendments to
existing masures are less burdensome than their predecessors,99 and
why the judiciary has not interpreted these measures as oppressively
as they might have done.
Pennsylvania's experience illustrates both legislative retrenchment
and judicial restraint. The initial Pennsylvania security for expenses
act imposed more severe restrictions than those of any other state,
since it provided no alternative to the requirement that plaintiffs furnish
security if they possessed less than five per cent of any outstanding class
of stock."' 0 In 1963, however, this condition was modified by an alterna-
tive provision: security should not be exacted if the market value of
shares held by those instituting the derivative suit exceeds $50,000. l
In addition, and of even greater importance, the legislature modified
the mandatory dictates of the earlier act by stipulating that:
[S] ecurity may be denied or limited in the discretion of
the court upon preliminary showing to the court . . . that the
requirement of security or full security would impose undue
hardship on plaintiffs and serious injustice would result.
10 2
Accompanying the subsection containing these provisions was
another subsection which stated that "reasonable expenses, including
attorneys' fees, of any party defendant incurred in connection with
the successful defense of such suit shall be assessed upon the corpora-
tion . . .," and that the amount of "all such expenses so assessed
shall be awarded as costs of the suit and be recoverable in the same
manner as statutory taxable costs." 103
Although the 1963 enactment is too new to permit assessment
of its impact on litigation, one Pennsylvania case, Shapiro v. Maga-
ziner,104 suggests it will be implemented with the judicial restraint
to which reference has been made. Plaintiff, who held more than five
47 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1 (1947); Ballantine, Abuses of Shareholders' Derivative Suits:
How Far Is California's New "Security for Expenses" Act Sound Regulation?, 37
CAxiF. L. REv. 399 (1949); Bowes, Should New York's "Security for Expenses" Act
Be Amended?, 2 SYRAcusE L. REv. 37 (1950).
99 The Model Act's optional provision § 43A is somewhat less burdensome than
many of the earlier security for expenses statutes in that it requires the posting of
security if the market value is under $25,000, rather than $50,000. Three states,
while adopting much of optional provision 43A, have omitted "attorney fees" from
the expenses for which security must be posted. See COLO. Izv. STAT. 31-4-21 (1963);
MD. R. Civ. P. 328(b) (1963); NEB. R-v. STAT. § 21-2047 (Supp. 1963).
100 Pa. Laws 1945, No. 114, at 253 (Now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Supp.
1966)).
101 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-516B (Supp. 1966).
102 Id. § 2852-516B (Supp. 1966).
103 Id. § 2852-516C (Supp. 1966).
104418 Pa. 278,'210 A.2d 890 (1965).
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per cent of the outstanding shares of the defendant corporation was,
nonetheless, ordered by the trial court to pay costs and reasonable
counsel fees if, after taking a voluntary nonsuit, he again pressed the
action. On appeal this determination was modified to exclude allow-
ance of counsel fees.
In reversing this part of the order, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's argument that subsection C permitted
a corporation to recover all expenses, including attorney's fees, from
a losing plaintiff regardless of the size of his holdings 08 On the con-
trary, the court held that the section was intended to encourage capable
and responsible people to become officers and directors by "shifting the
expenses of successful individual defendants to the corporation, not to
the losing plaintiff." 106 It is true, the court observed, that the newly
enacted law does permit the corporation such recovery when the
plaintiff holds "less than 5 per centum of the outstanding shares of
any class of such corporation . . .unless the shares . . . have a fair
market value in excess of fifty thousand dollars." 17 That provision
must, however, be confined to its purpose of preventing strike suits, it
being thought that such suits "were usually brought by shareholders
with only a small financial stake in the corporation." "08 The opinion
then added that security for expenses legislation "was not intended to
discourage derivative actions generally, a result which would follow
if appellees were to prevail .... ," 10'
While one may question the assertion that security for expenses
measures "were not intended to discourage derivative actions gen-
erally," nonetheless, it is true that had the court ruled in accordance
with defendant's wishes, a crushing blow would have been administered
to such litigation. Taken in isolation, the section on which the de-
fendants relied supported their position. Wisely, however, the court
held back, recognizing that if attorney's fees and other expenses were
to be imposed on a losing plaintiff in all derivative actions, a clearer
legislative mandate was needed.
It would be inappropriate to conclude these comments on security
for expenses statutes without a glance at later developments in New
York, the state which gave birth to the device. The picture that
emerges is somewhat murky. Despite recent changes in the cor-
poration code,110 the legislature has not seen fit to alter the conditions
105Id. at 281, 210 A.2d at 893.
"D6 Id. at 282, 210 A.2d at 893. (Emphasis in original.)
07 Id. at 283, 210 A.2d at 894.
1os Id. at 284, 210 A.2d at 894.
109 Id. at 285, 210 A.2d at 895.
110 New York's current business corporation law became effective Sept. 1, 1963.
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which were incorporated into the original enactment. Furthermore,
certain judicial decisions have suggested a rather inflexible construction
of these conditions, although other decisions have blunted the full
impact of the act.
In Baker v. MacFadden Publications, Inc.,"' for example, the
New York Court of Appeals approved a trial court order which
granted plaintiffs in a derivative action sixty days to join additional
shareholders in order to avoid the necessity of posting security. By
so deciding, the court gave support to a comparable position taken as
early as 1944 by the Supreme Court of New York County in the
case of Noel Associates Inc. v. Merrill."2
The Court of Appeals has not yet addressed itself to another, more
controversial holding in the Noel decision-that shareholders added in
an effort to meet the minimum five per cent or $50,000 requirement of
the security statute need not show that they owned their stock at the time
of the alleged wrong. The relationship between the contemporaneous
ownership requirement and the security for expenses statute, therefore,
remains uncertain to this date. In 1959, the Appellate Division of the
Second Department held in Richman v. Felmus " that only those in-
terveners may become "parties to the first cause of action who owned
some stock in April, 1952, the time of the transaction therein complained
of . . . . " " The opinion went on to explain that if interveners did
show that they owned a certain amount on the indicated date, any stock
acquired subsequent to that date could be counted for purposes of meet-
ing security requirements. The opinion made clear, however, that
the security law could not be avoided by adding shareholders who had
no stock at the time of the alleged wrong.
This clear-cut pronouncement did not persuade the Supreme Court
of the First Department, which in the following year held directly to
the contrary." In so doing it chose to adhere to the reasoning of the
Noel opinion "6 and quoted with approval the following observation:
If the Legislature had intended that the condition determining
the right of a plaintiff to bring an action under section 61
[the contemporaneous ownership requirement] be read into
the conditions determining the right of a defendant to obtain
security under section 61-b-namely, that in both respects
M11 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876, 59 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1950).
112184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
118 8 App. Div. 2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1959).
11Id. at 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
115 Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 429, 220 N.Y.S.Zd 760 (Sup.
Ct 1961).
116 184 Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct 1944).
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all the shares owned by the plaintiff shall have been owned
at the times of the wrongs complained of-the Legislature
could have spoken clearly to that effect.'
The confusion exhibited by the New York courts is reflected in
the efforts of the federal courts to apply the contemporaneous owner-
ship requirement of Federal Rule 23.1 to the New York security for
expenses statute in diversity cases. In the first case raising the ques-
tion, the District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
that intervening shareholders need not show they were contempo-
raneous owners at the time of the alleged wrong."' Subsequently,
however, other judges in the Southern District have ruled to the con-
trary, basing their decisions on a holding that the federal rules neces-
sitated such a result." 9 This conclusion has generally been criticized as
not being called for either by law or by policy. 2 '
While it may be conceded that under the Supreme Court's ruling
in Cohen,' federal courts should apply Rule 23.1 to diversity deriva-
tive actions, application of that rule does not require an interpretation
forbidding joinder of subsequent shareholders. The letter of the rule
is fulfilled if the plaintiff initiating the suit is a contemporaneous
owner. Furthermore, if the plaintiff is able to marshall interveners
possessing collectively $50,000 worth of security or five per cent of
any class of stock outstanding, it seems unlikely that the policy against
"purchased grievances" vould be seriously compromised. At least,
the danger does not seem sufficient to warrant the serious interference
which a contemporaneous ownership requirement would impose on
"the more fundamental policy of allowing derivative suits as a check
on the transgressions of corporate management." 12
Although the question whether intervening shareholders need be
contemporaneous owners remains confused, other aspects of the secu-
rity for expenses statute are in clearer focus. It is now accepted
practice to give a plaintiff time after he has filed his complaint to ascer-
tain whether other shareholders will join.' It has also been held
117 Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 429, 439, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760, 791
(Sup. Ct 1961), quoting Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 656-58, 53 N.Y.S.
2d 153-54.
318 Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 95 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
Ill Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Kaufman v. Wolfson,
136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
120 See 45 CALn*. L. REv. 80 (1957); 69 HARv. L. REv. 1504 (1956) ; 104 U. PA.
L. REv. 1108 (1956).
321 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
122104 U. PA. L. REv. 1108, 1110 (1956).
=3See Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Breswick &
Co. v. Briggs, 138 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Schreiber v. Butte Copper & Zinc
Co., 98 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry Co.,
97 F. Supp. 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Ratzkin v. Harris, 219 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct.
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on several occasions that he may have access to the corporation's list
of stockholders in order to facilitate his solicitation.' Finally, it
should be noted that federal courts have held that intervening stock-
holders, regardless of their domiciles, will not destroy existing diversity
of citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.'
Contemporaneous Ownership
The preceding discussion of the interaction between the rules re-
quiring contemporaneous ownership and security for expenses, should
not obscure the fact that the contemporaneous ownership require-
ment is, itself, a provision which, if narrowly construed, will pre-
clude many derivative suits. This is especially true because the con-
dition is two-pronged; plaintiff in a derivative action must allege
ownership as of the time of the transaction of which he complains and
as of the time of bringing suit. 6 In fact, he must, in the words of
one court, retain his status "in the corporation, for whose benefit he
sues, from the time the alleged improper acts occurred continuously
and uninterruptedly until after judgment is entered in the case." 127
It is evident, therefore, that many cases will turn on the con-
struction of the requirement, particularly on the breadth of meaning
to be given to the word "shareholder." It is significant to note that
such construction, generally speaking, has been as broad as can reason-
ably be justified. For example, enactments such as Federal Rule 23.1,
which prescribe that plaintiff must aver that he was "a shareholder
• . . at the time of the transaction . . . or that his share . . . there-
after devolved upon him by operation of law," have been interpreted
to permit derivative suits by: beneficiaries of securities held in trust; 128
1961) ; Christie v. Fifth Madison Corp., 124 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1953) ; Davidson
v. Rabinowitz, 140 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
The practice of allowing time to join additional plaintiffs in order to meet the
requirements of the security for expenses statute gave rise to an interesting variation
in Tyler v. Gas Consumers Ass'n, 34 Misc. 2d 947, 229 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct.
1962). The plaintiff shareholder was ordered to post $40,000 or to bring in addi-
tional shareholders in order to meet the five per cent or $50,000 statutory require-
ment. The plaintiff instead purchased sufficient shares to bring his personal holdings
to more than the required five per cent. Defendant thereupon moved for dismissal
of the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff had not fulfilled the terms of the order.
Motion granted. For a critical evaluation of this ruling, see 47 MixN. L. REv. 1119
(1963).
124 See Baker v. MacFadden Publications, 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950);
Ratzkin v. Harris, 219 N.Y.S.2d 665 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
125 See Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Weinstock v.
Kallett, 11 F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
'26 3 MooRE, FEDmuL PRAcrccE I 23.17-.18 (2d ed. 1966).
127 Gresov v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 569, 570, 243 N.Y.S.2d
760, 763 (Sup. Ct. 1963) ; accord, Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 429,
220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
M Brown v. Dolese, 38 Del. Ch. 471, 154 A.2d 233 (Ch. 1959); Schlegel v.
Schlegel Mfg. Corp., 23 App. Div. 2d 808, 258 N.Y.S.2d 587 (1965).
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owners of stock held in street names; 129 pledgees of stock; 130 parties
who have been induced by fraud to transfer legal title to others; 3'
legatees of stock who only had equitable title thereto.' 2  Furthermore,
courts have consistently held that owners of stock in parent companies
have sufficient interest in subsidiaries to enable them to maintain
actions on behalf of the subordinate corporations; that is, they have
been able to bring what is known as the "double derivative" suit. 33
Because subsidiaries are, for a variety of reasons, a popular means
of doing business, the latter development has considerable significance.
As one judge has observed, the layers and layers of separate corporate
entities, "pyramided in a form which centralizes control in the hands
of a few," necessitates special vigilance by a court of equity "to protect
the minority stockholders, whose money is in the control of those at
the top but whose voice receives no attention through the maze." 1
Obviously, the double derivative stockholder's suit is one device-
indeed, in the words of one writer, "the most significant and effective"
device-by which the vigilance of courts of equity may be triggered
into action. 35
Accompanying the tendency to give a broad construction to the
language of contemporaneous stockholder rules is the concept known
as the "continuing wrong" theory. Under this theory plaintiffs are
able to qualify as contemporary stockholders if they obtain ownership
status at any time the alleged wrong may be considered still in effect.
Two cases illustrate this point. In Palmer v. Morris,"6 the trans-
actions of which plaintiff complained occurred before he acquired his
stock, but payments were made on the basis of such transactions subse-
quent to his acquisitions. The court concluded that plaintiff had
standing to sue. In another action, Gluck v. Unger,137 it was alleged
that a merger between the companies was wrongfully consummated.
It was further alleged that a suit brought by the first corporation against
the second corporation because of the merger resulted in a fraudulent
129 Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760 (Ch. 1964); Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc. v. Saks, 35 Del. Ch. 503, 122 A.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
130 Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y.
1964).
3'3 Willcox v. Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
132Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1944).
13 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944); Kaufman v.
Wolfson, 132 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hirshorn v. Mine Safety Appliances
Co., 54 F. Supp. 588 (W.D. Pa. 1944).
' 34 1Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum & Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 665,
21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 711 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
135 Painter, Docble Derivative Suits and Other Remedies With Regard to Dam-
aged Subsidiaries, 36 IxD. L.J. 143, 144 (1961).
136 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963).
137 25 Misc. 2d 554, 202 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct 1960).
19671
96 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and unfair settlement. The court held that a plaintiff who acquired
shares after the merger, but before the settlement, was a contempora-
neous owner and thus had a right to bring an action.
While not all courts have been as ready to entertain suits under
the "continuing wrong" approach,' it is evident that the theory has
on occasion opened doors to plaintiffs who otherwise might have been
barred. In addition, some legislatures have apparently adopted the
concept, since the statutes of California,'39 Ohio " and Wisconsin 4
simply require that ownership be shown as of the time of the trans-
action complained of or "any part thereof."
Corresponding to the liberal treatment accorded to the meaning
of the term "shareholder," is a recent law enacted by the Pennsylvania
legislature modifying the contemporaneous ownership rule.' The
statute gives a plaintiff the option of showing that he held "a beneficial
interest" in shares as an alternative to the requirement that he aver that
he was a stockholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains. Furthermore, the legislature included an "out" similar
to the one already observed in connection with the security for expenses
provision, for the ownership clause now provides:
that any shareholder or person beneficially interested in shares
of the corporation, who except for this section would be
entitled to maintain such a suit and who does not meet such
requirements, may, nevertheless, in the discretion of the court,
be allowed to maintain such suit on preliminary showing to
the court . . . that there is a strong prima facie case in
favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation and
that without such suit serious injustices will result.'
In sharp contrast to this attitude is the requirement of some
states that a plaintiff show he was a registered shareholder at the
time of the actions of which he complains.'44 Also in contrast is
a recent amendment of optional section 43A of the Model Business
Corporation Act, adding the term "of record" to the requirement of
contemporaneous ownership.3' To date, it appears that only the state
of Washington has adopted this precise phraseology. 4 "
'3 8 See Weinhaus v. Gale, 237 F.2d 197 (7th Cir. 1956).
139 CAL. CORP. CODE § 834.
140 OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.311 (Page Supp. 1966).
141 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1957).
142 PA. STAT. ANN. it. 15, § 2852-516 (Supp. 1966).
143 Id.
'44 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CoDE § 834 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405 (1957).
145ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoR. AcT § 12 (Supp. 1966).
146 WAsH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 23A.08.460 (Supp. 1966) (effective July 1, 1967).
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Although "registered" ownership and ownership "of record" add
precision to the requirement, it may be that these phrases will prove
too restrictive. Little evidence is available to suggest that non-
record holders, who have been permitted to bring suit in the past under
standard contemporaneous ownership clauses, have abused the right.
Nor can it be shown that the real investment of a non-record holder
in a corporation is necessarily less substantial than is the interest of
many record holders. It would seem that these phrases are the
products either of general hostility to derivative suits or of an exag-
gerated fear of purchased litigation.
Demands on Directors and Shareholders
Discussion of prevailing trends concerning conditions essential
to the bringing of derivative suits would be incomplete without refer-
ence to the requirement relating to demands on directors and share-
holders. This requirement dates back to the formative years in the
history of shareholder suits and was first voiced by the Supreme Court
in 1881 in the case of Hawes v. Oakland . 4 7 As now incorporated into
the federal rules, it reads as follows:
The complaint shall . . . allege with particularity the
efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if
necessary, from the shareholders . . . and the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." s
Since this rule, or one comparable to it, has been adopted by
legislative or judicial action in many states, its significance to deriva-
tive actions is readily apparent. That demand of some sort be a
condition precedent to most derivative actions is a rule of considerable
merit, for such actions should only be tolerated in the event the cor-
poration refuses or is powerless to act on its own behalf. This ob-
servation, however, does not mean that proof of demand should always
be a condition precedent, nor does it resolve questions relating to the
nature of the demand or the parties to whom the demand should
be addressed.
These factors are especially important since Federal Rule 23.1
allows much discretion to the courts. This rule does not per se
require demand of either directors or shareholders, but merely insists
that the plaintiff allege "with particularity the efforts" made to obtain
action from the directors and "if necessary" from the shareholders.
147104 U.S. 450 (1882).
14s FED. R. Crv. P. 23.1,
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It then provides that he must explain the reasons, if he does not obtain
action or does not make efforts to secure it. It is, of course, obvious
that the rule anticipates that demand normally will be made, but it is
also obvious that the rule recognizes exceptions to the requirement.
Because of this built-in flexibility, it is a mistake for courts to
apply the rule, and those fashioned after it, in a mechanical manner.
This fact is being increasingly recognized and observed. It is gen-
erally accepted, for example, that demand need not be made of directors
personally involved in the alleged wrongdoing,'49 and demand on
directors has also been viewed as superfluous where the alleged wrong-
doer is the controlling shareholder.' Comparable flexibility may also
be observed in cases concerned with demands on shareholders. In
such instances, of course, the wise and reasonable use of judicial dis-
cretion is essential, for the indiscriminate imposition of this requirement
could seriously impede or even prevent many meritorious derivative
suits. Because of this danger, distinctions should be, and have been,
recognized between closely-held and public corporations.'5 ' Note also
has been taken of the degree of shareholder involvement in the alleged
wrongdoing, 52 and some courts have realistically taken into account
the realities of proxy control in ascertaining whether a demand on
shareholders should be imposed as a condition precedent to bringing
suit.153
It should be noted that the preceding paragraphs have been ad-
dressed to the issue of the necessity for demand, and not to the separate
question of the effect of action taken by directors or shareholders pur-
suant to demand. Normally the question posed by such action has
been whether or not the wrongs alleged could be ratified by the ad-
dressees of the demand. As has been stated, this is a separate question.
If, however, courts are of the opinion that ratification of an alleged
wrong, even by disinterested directors or shareholders, cannot pro-
hibit a minority action, they should obviously take such a conclusion
into account in ascertaining whether they should insist on a demand.
Some courts have stated that this conclusion should preclude the need
149 See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 1 23.19 (2d ed. 1966) and cases cited therein.
150 See Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp., 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1964). Contra
James Talcott, Inc. v. McDowell, 148 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1962).
151 See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964) (stressing the burden of
making a demand on 48,000 stockholders, and contrasting the situation with that in
Halpin v. Babbitt, 303 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1962) where one shareholder held 92%
of all company stock); Berg v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 56 F. Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky.
1944). Contra Quirke v. St. Louis, S.F. Ry., 277 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1960) ; Haffer v.
Voit, 219 F.2d 704 (6th Cir. 1955).
'
5 2 See Pioche Mines Consol. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Cathedral
Estates, Inc. v. Taft Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Forbes v. Wilson,
243 F. 264 (N.D. Ohio 1917).
1 53 See Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 268 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1959).
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for demand." Others have noted that there may be merit, nonetheless,
in having the alleged wrongs called to the attention of directors and
shareholders.l 5
In appraising current attitudes towards demand, it is of more
than passing interest to note that three significant industrial states,
California, Ohio and New York, provide for demand on directors, but
omit the need for demand on shareholders.Y" The Ohio and New
York enactments are particularly significant. The legislature in Ohio
spoke out within a few months after the state supreme court had
imposed a rather rigid and far reaching shareholder demand require-
ment on derivative suit plaintiffs. 57 In New York, a demand upon
shareholders clause was included in the study bill submitted to the
legislature in 1960, but was removed from the bill presented for passage
in 1961. This deletion purportedly followed public hearings at which
it was argued that "demand upon shareholders was too onerous; par-
ticularly in the case of suit brought against directors and officers of
large corporations with far flung shareholdings." "' Since demand
requirements were initially imposed by judicial decree,"59 it should not
be assumed automatically that an approach to shareholders is un-
necessary in these jurisdictions. It would appear, however, that the
historical context in which the legislatures in Ohio and New York
acted, makes their intent clear, and it also seems fair to conclude that
the California legislature has voiced its policy with precision by its
deliberate omission of a common requirement.
Expenses and Counsel Fees
One additional development relating to derivative suits is worthy
of note: the more realistic judicial position in reference to the allowance
of expenses and counsel fees to successful plaintiffs."z 0
54 See, e.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
155 See Rogers v. American Can Co., 305 F.2d 297 (3rd Cir. 1962).
156CAL. CORP. CODE §834 (1955); N.Y. Bus. Coar. LAw § 626 (McKinney's
1963); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.311 (Page Supp. 1966).
157 Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E,2d 429 (1955), which not
only held demand was necessary, but also stated that a disinterested majority could
ratify directors' frauds. See Note, Shareholder Demand as a Condition Precedent
to Derivative Suits-A Proposed Compromise, 30 U. CINc. L. REv. 196 (1961).
158 Hoffman, The Status of Shareholders and Directors Under New York's
Business Corporation Law: A Comparative View, 11 BuFFALO L. REv. 496, 504 (1962).
15 9 E.g., Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) ; Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont,
206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912).
160 For a general discussion of counsel fees in reference to derivative actions, see
Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage Factor" in Counsel Fee Awards, 69
HAgv. L. REv. 658 (1956) ; Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative
Suits, 39 CoLxim. L. REV. 784 (1939).
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Early decisions took the position that only in the event the cor-
poration gained pecuniary benefit from a derivative suit was plaintiff
to be allowed expenses.'"' The emphasis was on tangible financial
gain, and thus benefits of a non-financial nature were given but slight
consideration. Furthermore, the emphasis referred to often meant that
the time, experience and "know how" involved in an action went
uncompensated.
Recognizing the restrictive nature of the pecuniary benefit ap-
proach, many courts have substituted a "substantial benefit" test.'
This test does not limit inquiry to whether the corporation received
direct financial gain from plaintiff's action, but rather permits investi-
gation into direct and indirect, pecuniary and non-pecuniary, results.
Under this approach, for example, courts have recognized benefits from
a derivative suit which produced: the cancellation of a proposed issue
of securities which would have upset the voting and redemptive rights
of certain shareholders; 13 a temporary injunction restraining a cor-
poration from paying certain sums of money; 164 the cancellation of
a stock option plan; 165 the rescinding of share purchases by a cor-
poration; 166 the enjoining of certain ultra vires acts; 167 and by implica-
tion, the invalidation of election of directors. 6"
These examples suggest that courts have found substantial benefit
in instances where primary relief has been to stockholders and not to
the corporation. 69 Furthermore, they show that the benefit concept
is satisfied if the action compels the corporation to act within its au-
thority even though no direct pecuniary advantages may result. 7 0  In
addition, these cases reveal that courts are willing to grant expenses
and legal fees even though the suits in question were settled before
trial. 17' The test applied was whether the action taken was the product
of plaintiff's initiative.
Although the more liberal judicial attitude toward plaintiff's ex-
penses, including counsel fees, is to be commended, it should be recog-
nized that a too liberal policy will encourage strike suits. It is essential,
161 See, e.g., Burley Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762, 178 S.W. 1102 (1915).
162 See, e.g., Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537, 540 (2d Cir. 1957); Per-
gament v. Kaiser-Frazer Corp., 224 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1965).
163 Berger v. Amana Soc'y, 135 N.W.2d 618 (Iowa 1965).
164 Modern Optics Inc. v. Buck, 336 S.W.2d 857 (Texas Civ. App. 1960).
165Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 209 A.2d 459 (Del. Ch. 1949).
16 6 Denny v. Phillips & Buttorff Corp., 331 F2d 249 (6th Cir. 1964).
'0 7 Abrams v. Textile Realty Corp., 97 N.Y.S.2d 492 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
168 Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Assn., 257 Minn. 362, 101 N.W.2d
423 (1960).
16 9 See note 163 supra.
170 See note 167 supra.
1
7 1 See Mintz v. Bohen, 210 A.2d 569 (Del. Ch. 1965); Rosenthal v. Burry
Biscuit Corp., 209 A.2d 459 (Del. Ch. 1949).
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therefore, that many factors be appraised carefully in determining
whether expenses should be allowed, and, if so, in what amount. To
hold, for example, that the pecuniary benefit concept is too narrow
does not mean that the reality of financial benefits should be ignored.
Nor is it inappropriate to consider the good faith of the plaintiff and
the substance of his complaint in ascertaining fees." 2 To these factors,
of course, should be added traditional considerations such as the
time fairly required, the intricacy and novelty of the issues, and the
difficulty and expense encountered in ascertaining facts." 3 It is in
the careful appraisal of these items that a balance can be struck between
an overly restrictive approach which discourages and hampers cor-
porate policing by shareholders, and a too generous approach which
encourages nuisance actions.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion of developments related to derivative
suits has admittedly been predicated on a relatively close selection of
cases. It is believed, however, that such cases are indicative of con-
temporary trends. If this reading is correct, it obviously will disturb
those who hold that "every stockholders' suit is ipso facto a strike
suit," 114 and counter-measures which seek to hamper derivative plain-
tiffs are to be anticipated. To those impelled to seek such measures a
word of caution is suggested. It is unlikely that those who control
corporate property and policy will ever again be permitted the freedom
of an earlier era. It may be a mistake, therefore, either to erect addi-
tional hurdles to the bringing of stockholders' suits or to fortify
present ones. If such action is taken, alternative controls will certainly
be created. Can anyone doubt that such alternative controls will
take the form of federal government actions?
'
7 2 See Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 353, 149
N.Y.S.2d 840 (1956).
1
7 3 See Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1959).
174 Herlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Micr. L. REv. 597,
605 (1937).
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